The nuclear deal between the U.S. and India On March 2, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have been presented to reporters gathered in the gardens of Government House in New Delhi and during the joint press conference announced the conclusion of important agreements of cooperation in many industries, including nuclear. Under the terms of the cartel in the nuclear field, the culmination of negotiations begun in July 2005 at the time of the visit by Singh to Washington and concluded In the 15 hours before arrival of the White House in India, the two countries are committed to a mutual exchange of knowledge and nuclear technology and New Delhi, despite not having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 prohibit any non-signatory nations to be able to obtain fissile material, you can buy from the United States provided is used only for civilian use. Washington has committed to disposing of the waste material that will produce and in return, India agreed to make a clear separation of nuclear energy for civilian and military purposes by subjecting 14 of its 22 reactors to the system of internal inspections of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under this agreement, 65 percent of its nuclear power will be dedicated to civilian use while the remainder was for military purposes, without any kind of international control. Not only that, the eight reactors are removed from the IAEA's inspections including breeder, capable of producing large quantities of plutonium can be easily used to build more nuclear warheads. The agreement between the two leaders has attracted very mixed reactions. According to the forces of opposition to the Singh government, particularly the Communist-inspired, the agreement allows the U.S. an undue interference in the internal affairs of India. In Washington, where the Senate to ratify the agreement completed will amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 against the sale of nuclear technology to countries that do not participate in the conventions against nuclear proliferation, many are convinced that the agreement could not be concluded at a worse time: With what moral authority the U.S. submit to the Security Council plans to enrich uranium for civilian purposes Ahmadinejad of Iran, a signatory to the NPT, if not only gave their green light for similar projects conducted by New Delhi but also enabled India to keep intact nuclear programs for military purposes while not a nation that signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty? "The subcontinent is not as Iran or North Korea ", was quick to support the Under Secretary Nicholas Burns, is a reliable country that does not deceive the international community, is the world's most populous democracy and the United States must trust in New Delhi . The new Bush nuclear policy towards India is a complete reversal of the direction followed by his predecessors. The Clinton administration, to combat nuclear programs by the Indian authorities decided to impose a penalty by starting the progressive international isolation of the subcontinent. Today the situation is different: Bush, during a press conference with Singh said that the agreement signed with his counterpart shows that times have changed. Compared to the Clinton years, the international political and economic context has changed profoundly: the unipolar order dominated by the United States, following the collapse of the USSR, has been replaced by a multipolar structure and new power centers have emerged (such as China, the same as India, Brazil, etc..) influencing the choices of Washington and New Delhi and pushing them, each for different reasons to conclude the agreement. Some commentators have likened Bush's trip to India and the agreement with Singh at the historic visit of Nixon to China in 1972 which marked the beginning of triangular diplomacy of Kissinger, the U.S. disengagement from Vietnam and the start the second detente with the USSR. The India of today is not comparable to Mao's China, however, its role on the international scene today is similar, and a concrete approach with the United States could be useful strategies for Washington's foreign policy. The Indian subcontinent is the largest democracy in the world, is an example of coexistence (certainly not easy) between different faiths. Suffice it to say that there are at least 150 million Muslims, is a rising economic power in the production system, based on high technology, could provide an important resource to support U.S. economic growth by strengthening trade and above could be a valuable counterweight to growing Chinese influence in Asia and the world. In public statements Bush has argued that the U.S. interest to India is an important step in implementing the new energy strategy of his administration in favor of reducing dependence on oil and developing alternative sources. Through the sale of fissile material the U.S. intend to address the unique "hunger" power of the Indian subcontinent encouraging the use of atomic technology with the effect of reducing both the international pressure on oil demand and the upward trend in the price of hydrocarbons. Not only that, with the transfer of nuclear fuel to India the United States can recycle most of the fissile material from the dismantling of their nuclear weapons obsolete. In reality, the energy cooperation agreements are only the first step in a broader alliance. This is testified by direct economic agreements signed in parallel with nuclear agreements. After the talks, the Pentagon said the U.S. has committed to sell India F-16 fighters and F-18 with other advanced defense systems. The two parties have committed themselves to intensify their economic relations to double trade in three years, but especially the two leaders' insistence on the common values \u200b\u200bof democracy and the fight against terrorism are think about the possibility of initiating a global partnership between the U.S. and India. Washington to New Delhi would not only be a valid instrument for containing Chinese expansionism, but also a valuable ally in the fight against international terrorism as well as support for the strategy of spreading democracy with well-defined responsibilities. When Bush claimed that India would have the moral duty to intervene in favor of freedom and democracy in countries like Myanmar, Syria, Zimbabwe, seem to foreshadow a real division of labor and spheres of action between the U.S. and India. Certainly, India can not be an ally as Great Britain. E ' more likely to take on the characteristics of an Asian sort of France, a country with whom to share common interests and strategies but unable to see the world and the other powers with their own eyes and perspective, independent from those of Washington. The parallel between India and France in the varied landscape of the types of covenants by the United States over time must not appear hazardous. It 's true that the strengthening of economic exchanges with Washington can be very useful to a nation that grows with higher annual rates through eight per cent and it is no coincidence that immediately after the news broke of the positive results of the talks the Bush-Singh, The Bombay Stock Exchange, the Indian stock market has experienced a huge increase the turnover exceeds the record level of 10,700 points. The agreement will allow India to ally with the biggest world economic power, will open the way for a beneficial exchange of "brains" (think of the phenomenal Indian computer scientists) and research as well as a huge flow of investment in infrastructure and energy non-bidirectional. It 'also true that the nuclear agreements will allow India to take the easier path of diversification of energy supplies more efficiently meet the growing needs of an increasingly dynamic economy. The approach to the United States may be the last step towards the general recognition of its status as an emerging power and the final entry into the select club of nations capable of influencing the destinies of the world. However, despite the hopes invested in the alliance recently concluded in Washington, New Delhi is not London, Paris can be a maximum. Although the agreements with the Bush administration are important, India is keen to maintain their freedom of movement and engagement with everyone. Inside the country's nationalist tendencies and the desire to maintain open relations with the various international counterparts are important: the nuclear deal with the U.S. it could be concluded only hours after opening negotiations in July 2005 just because the Indians did everything they could to have the last word on the division for civilian or military use of atomic energy. On the international scene, India is looking for partners not bosses or allies, but when the reports are too biased in their favor. To determine such an attitude are the same basic elements of his face social and economic well diversified. The skyrocketing energy thirst rippling economic growth forced the authorities in New Delhi to maintain good relations with the nations of the Middle East and particularly Iran, where the continuity of oil supply is too important to convince the Indians to follow without exception and distinguish the anti-nuclear policy of Washington towards Tehran. The same considerations must be made with regard to Kashmir. Governments in New Delhi are particularly sensitive to criticism of the major Muslim countries to the Indian projects for the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kashmir dispute with Pakistan as they fear the possibility of aid to the authorities in Islamabad by states led by Islamic theocracies. Similar appreciations shall apply to the relationship between India and China. Recently resolved territorial disputes, the current state of development the subcontinent can not afford to hire an open conflict with Beijing. Each of the two forces tend to preserve their spheres of influence and to strengthen commercial relations and the recent rapprochement New Delhi with Washington could be useful to the Indians to deal with China from a position of strength. Certainly the choice of field made to India by the Americans can not remain without consequences in the balance in Asia. Apart from the fact that the nuclear exception for India made could lead to a new regional arms race, the nuclear deal between Washington and New Delhi is a serious blow to the usual U.S. equidistance between India and Pakistan, two nations with nuclear weapons and always on the verge of a possible conflict. On March 4, after India, Bush has also paid an official visit to Pakistan where he held talks with President General Pervez Musharraf. The latter, which came to power in 1999 with a bloodless military coup, has managed to remain at his post by embracing the American cause of fighting terrorism and becoming one of Washington's main allies in Asia. After the India-US nuclear deal, Musharraf thought he could "cash dividends" of the alliance with Washington to Bush asking for a similar nuclear assistance. But the president did not want to equate India and Pakistan, causing a significant weakening of Musharraf, already besieged by public criticism from Islamic fundamentalists close to the positions which they regard the alliance with the U.S. a pact with the devil. The reason the attitude of Bush is to be found in the alleged assistance to Pakistani nuclear scientists like AQ Khan's nuclear program. If it is not inconceivable that China, a traditional ally of Pakistan, you might decide to intervene to ensure that in Islamabad the same kind of nuclear assistance to India guaranteed by the U.S., the consequences of the weakening of Musharraf's leadership within his own country could have serious consequences for Washington's anti-terrorism strategy. The Pakistani press articles have appeared very critical of the general lack of people who are not asked to review the policy of alliance with the U.S. in combating terrorism. Many observers believe Bin Laden and Mullah Omar operating from Pakistani territory. If al-Qaeda will manage to strengthen further, one can not reject the hypothesis of a parallel consolidation of the extremists in neighboring Bangladesh where the government has not been able to contain incidents of violence and fundamentalist attempts to avoid two assassination of Musharraf, so we are talking about possible Talibanization of Bangladesh. The same could be true for Malaysia with the result of a general weakening of the Asian front against Islamic terrorism.
